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NOTES
THE UNIFORM SALES ACT IN KENTUCKY
The recent session of the Kentucky legislature witnessed the
adoption of the Uniform Sales Act. While Kentucky has been
rather hesitant in the adoption of this uniform measure, just as
it has been in the adoption of others, there are increasing evidences of a trend toward uniform legislation This year for
the first time a report on the progress of uniform legislation
was included in the regular business of the Kentucky Bar Association. This report which was read by Judge Waddell and
which will appear shortly in the Kentucky Bar Association Journal outlines the several uniform acts which have already been
adopted. Official recognition has been given this move toward
uniformity in the appointment by the Governor of two representatives from the Bar of the State to sit with the National Commissioners on Uniform Legislation. In the instant ease at least
there appears to be little or no room for doubting either the advantage or necessity of the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act.
There is no finer epitomy of the commercial benefits to be derived
from the adoption of the Sales Act than the statement issued
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 19211
It is always hazardous to predict changes which such legislation will effect in the pre-existing state law. It is not different in the case at hand. However, the mandatory rule of construction which the Sales Act itself lays down renders the present
task a bit less difficult. Profiting from experience with the Negotiable Instruments Law a provision was inserted in the Sales
2
Act which to a greater or lesser extent insures uniformity. It
is worthy of note that it is a mandatory rule of construction
rather than merely directory as in the Sales Acts of several
states. 3
Of course the most important change effectuated by the
adoption of the Uniform Act is the change from the metaphysical theory of documents of title to the mercantile view. This
14

Texas Law Review 330.

2Sales

Act, section 74: "This act shall be so interpreted and con-

strued as to effectuate its general puprose to make uniform the law of
those states which enact it."
'Nine states are cited in Williston on Sales, section 617, note 1.
These states add the words "if possible" after the word "construed."

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

change of basic theory is fundamental to any proper understanding of the exact changes which the various sections of the
Act are expected to effect. The obvious purpose behind such a
change is to give documents of title fuller and more complete
negotiability. Some states had by judicial decision already effected some of these changes toward negotiability. Still others
had accomplished the same result by the adoption of the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, or the Uniform Warehouse Re ejpts
Act. Kentucky had Aone none of these. 4 Moreover the change
is the more noticeable since Kentucky was pronounced in her
following of the metaphysical or symbolical theory of Aocuments
of "title. An earlier case is representative when it says: "Such
a transfer of the bill of lading (to a pledgee) is regarded as the
equivalent to investing the pledgee with actual possession of the
property.'"' This is equivalent to saying that possession of the
document of title is symbolical possession of the goods themselves. Contrast -with this the mercantile view which the Sales
Act adopts: "A document of title in which it is stated that the
goods referred to therein will be delivered to the bearer, or to
the order of any person named in such document is a negotiable
document of title.''6 This general change of theory is quite
basic to the following discussion of the exact practical changes
which are effectea by sections 27 to 39 inclusive of the Sales Act.
Sections 27 to 39 inclusive are merely concrete expressions
of the results which should be attendant upon this changed viewpoint. All changes are toward negotiability. They follow in
rather' strict analogy the codified law governing bills of ex7
change and promis'sory notes.
Section 28 provides for the negotiation of negotiable documents of title by delivery. The essence of the section is that a
bill of lading indorsed in blank paskes title to the goods by delivery of the bill of lading. This Wakes the bill of lading indicia
of both ownership and possession of the goods whereas it had
formerly been merely a symbol of possession. Apparently the
Kenicky 6ourt would not -previously have recognized negotia4

But Kentucky has a statute declaring warehouse receipts negoti-

able. Farmerv. Etheridge, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 649, 69 S. W. 761 (1902).
'Douglas v. Bank, 86 Ky. 176, 5 S. W. 420 (1887). Accord L. & N.
Railroad Company v. Mengel Company, 220 Ky. 289, 295 S. W. 183
(1927).

'Sales Act, s~ction 27.

"Williston on Sales, section 408.
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tion by delivery alone, for an earlier case says flatly: "When it
issaid that uch a bill of lading is negotiable, it is only meant
that its true owner may transfer it by endorsement or assignment
so as to vest the legal title in the endorsee."8 That the Sales
Act would place such documents of title on a footing with negotiable instruments in so far as negotiation by delivery is concerned may be seen by a comparisop of sections 1, 30, and 40 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law with the present section.
Section 29 provides for negotiation by indorsement. This
is important when taken in connection with the. other sections.
The contrast betwe6n this provision and the common law idea
is apparent from the quotation found in the preceding paragraph. It is essentially the difference between negotiation and
assignment. 9
Sections 30 and 31 provide for negotiable documents of title
marked "not negotiable" and the transfer of non-negotiable documents respectively. These sections are explicit in their provisions and are of lesser importance in this brief discussion. The
10
former is aimed at a very widespread practice among carriers.
Section 32 in the newly adopted Kentucky Sales Act is
somewhat changed from that of the uniform law. The uniform
law gives merely "limited negotiability" to documents of title,
contrasted with the full negotiability given to a bill of exchange,
in that neither a thief nor a finder is withiin the terms of the section.1 1 The Kentucky Act provides that, "a document of title
mayb6 negotiated by any person in possession of the.same, however such possession may have been acquired, if by the terms of
the document the bailee issuingit undertakes to'deliver the goods
to the order of such person, or if at the time of the negotiation
the document is in such form that it may be negotiated by delivery." The Uniform Act is identical except that it omits the
words underscored--"however such possession may have been
acquired." It is seen that the Kentucky provision gives full negotiability. This is what the 'Uniform Bills of Lading Act has
done and presumably the provision of that Act has been copied
3Douglas v. Bank, supra note 5. See the lately' decided case of
L. & X. Railroad Company v. Mengel Company, 220 Ky. 299, 295 S .W.
183 (1927) which re-affirms the earlier adherence to the symbolical
theory of documents of title.
OPoZard v. Vinton, 105 U. S. 7 (1881).

'*Madden's
Uniform Sales Act, pages 48, 49.
1
', Madden's Uniform Sales Act, page 50.
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into the Sales Act in Kentucky. At least one other state, Iowa,
has done the same thing.12 This change is highly desirable.13
In fact this change was advocated by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Section 33 enables the purchaser of a document of title to
acquire the right of his vendor, just as he did in Kentucky under
the assignment theory, 14 and in addition to acquire whatever
property the original depositor had. This latter portion is an
extension of the common law right. 15 Section 34 and 35 are explicit and require no discussion. Section 36 is interesting in
that it carries over almost bodily the like provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 16
Section 38 is an elaboration on section 32.17 Here again
the changed act provides for full negotiability whereas the uniform act provides for more limited negotiability. s But in distinction to section 32 this provision goes even further than the
Uniform Bills of Lading Act.19
While we have been unable to find any Kentucky cases exactly in point with the problem involved in this section we may
be sure that before the.Sales Act the Kentucky court would have
reached a different result as to the impairment of the negotiation by the various matters enumerated in section 38. Other
states reached a different result under the common-law or symbolical theory. 20 Williston 2l summarizes the process of reasoning in such cases thus: "What has been called the common-law
view, which treats delivery of the documents of title as merely
13 Iowa Law Bulletin 67, 98.
"Williston on Sales, section 414.
"Newcomb v. Cabefl, 10 Bush 460.
"Madden's Uniform Sales Act, page 51.
"Negotiable Instruments Act, section 65.
"'Madden's Uniform Sales Act, page 54. "It Is said in the draftsman's notes to this section of the act, 'This section merely elaborates
for the sake of clearness certain special cases within the terms of section 32'." 3 Iowa Law Bulletin 100.
'-The model Act said that equities for fraud, mistake or duress

were cut off in the hands of a purchaser for value without notice. The

changed Kentucky Act goes further and adds loss, theft, accident and
conversion to the list.
"The Uniform Bills of Lading Act adds accident and conversion to
the list over the Sales Act but the Sales Act as recently adopted in
Kentucky goes even further and adds loss and theft also.
"Stollenwerck v. Thatcher, 115 Mass. 224 (1873); Dews v. Nationa?
Exchage.Bank, 91 U. S. 618 (1875).
"Section 437.

U
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equivalent to the delivery of the goods, leads to a different result. For a mere delivery of the goods themselves does not enable
the person to transfer ownership, so it is held that delivery of
any document of title can have no greater effect." And we are
sure that the Kentucky court has evidenced no inclination to depart from the common-law theory of documents of title for as
late as April 22, 192722 it said: "The latter (consignor) delivered to them a bill of lading, which was the symbol of the property named therein."
We may summarize that the Kentucky court may be expected to treat documents of title in the future in practically all
respects as it does bills of exchange and promissory notes. Documents of title are to all practical purposes accorded full negotiability. We may also expect the Kentucky court to give such
effect as the objectives of the commissioners and the mandates of
uniformity dictate, especially since this has been the attitude
of the Kentucky court toward other uniform legislation. 23 We
have only dealt with the direct changes toward negotiability effected by the adoption of the Sales Act. We have not even dealt
with the possible indirect changes such as the effect on the view
as to documents of title taken as collateral security, or again, as
to provisions for risk of loss.2 Nor have we dealt with direct
changes outside of the field of negotiability. These changes may
be predicted with fair accuracy by a comparison of the notes as
to the changes effected in other common-law states which had
2
adopted the act some years before Kentucky. 5
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d .N. Railroad Company v. Mengel, 220 Ky. 289, 295 S. W. 183.
"Finley v. Smith, 165 Ky. 445, 177 S. W. 262 (1915).
2116 Kentucky Law Journal 235, 240.
"3 Iowa Law Bulletin 67; 9 California Law Review 27; 3 Nebraska
Law Bulletin 201; 26 Dickinson Law Review 151.
22L.

